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A PROPOSED METHOD OF CONTROL
ALONA E. EVANS*
The author demonstrates the type of foreign and domestic interests
that may be infringed by hijacking but concludes that, given the nature
of the offense and even assuming cooperation among all states to reduce
the incidence using such methods as registration, search, publication and
extradition, it is still unlikely that the problem can be completely solved.
The article examines the problem in terms of attempts to provide con-
trols by varying degrees of international recognition of the seriousness
of the offense and subsequent cooperation among the state to accom-
plish a cure.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OFFENSE
T HE upsurge in crime rates during the past decade and a half in both
the United States' and other countries has encompassed interna-
tional aviation in different ways.' Of all the crimes involving aircraft
and related facilities, however, perhaps the most common during the
past three years has been hijacking-the illegal diversion of a com-
mercial aircraft from its scheduled destination.! Although one instance
of aircraft hijacking probably occurred before the Second World War,'
the act became conspicuous in the late 1940s when individuals began to
flee from authoritarian states by diverting aircraft as well as other modes
of transportation. The number of successful instances of hijacking be-
* A.B., Ph.D., Duke University; Elizabeth Kimball Kendall, Professor of Political
Science, Wellesley College; Member, Board of Editors, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW.
' For United States figures, see UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1969 (1970).
'See, e.g., Graham v. Colorado, 302 P.2d 757 (Colo. 1956) (murder). See also the
terrorist attack upon the El Al passenger terminal in Athens, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28,
1969, § 1, at 1, col. 6 [city edition will be used unless otherwise noted]; Extortion of
$560,000 from Qantas in return for information about the location of a bomb on board
an airline which proved to be a hoax. Id. May 27, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
' "Aircraft hijacking," as used in this paper, covers only the illegal diversion of a
commercial aircraft to a destination outside the country of origin of the flight, and the
statistics used will be limited to such incidents. Terminologically, "hijacking" is more
descriptive of this contemporary offense than "piracy" which is a term of art in inter-
national law. See Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure, 63 AM. J. INT'L L.
695, 696-97 (1969).
4Hearings on Aircraft Hijackings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., 168 (1970).
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tween 1948 and 1971,' however, does not satisfactorily explain the pat-
term of development of this international offense. Account must be
taken, for example, of the fact that the United States, the victim of
almost fifty per cent of the hijackings during the past decade, has the
greatest amount of foreign and domestic air traffic of any country;' con-
sequently, the opportunity for hijacking has been greater here than else-
where. Yet political motives have been incidental to or nonexistent in a
substantial number of the eighty-three successful hijackings here and
abroad of aircraft of United States registration.
The motives for hijacking can be classified conveniently, if not pre-
cisely, into two categories: (1) furtherance of personal or "private"
objectives, including political ends; and (2) furtherance of "public"
objectives, including both foreign policy aims and insurrectionary ac-
tivities."
In the "private" category, it is not surprising that fugitives from civil
or military justice should take to the air. There have been a number of
instances of persons involved in domestic difficulties making dramatic
exits from their estranged spouses, sometimes accompanied by minor
children for good measure. Furthermore, the combination of hijacking
and extortion has become popular in the past two years.' Mental de-
rangement is another obvious explanation for many hijackings and has
barred prosecution or provided a defense in some cases.'
Despite incomplete data on many instances of hijacking, it would
appear that political motives, including dissatisfaction with an authori-
tarian regime or fear of persecution for political opinion, race or reli-
gion, have been the primary aim in the bulk of the hijackings occurring
outside the United States. The sporadic nature of these hijackings can
I From January 1, 1948, to July 1, 1971, there have been 204 successful hijackings,
89 originating in the United States and 115 originating in other countries. See Appendix,
Table II infra at 231. The bulk of these hijackings took place between January 1, 1968,
and December 31, 1970. Id.
" Approximately 12,000 flights originate in the United States daily. See Hearings on
H.R. 14,465 Before the Subcomm. on Avi. of the Senate Commerce Comm., 91st Cong.,
1st and 2d Sess. (1969-70).
7 Compare Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Schtraks [1962] 3 All
E. R. 529 (H.L.) with Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Kolczynski,
[1955] 1 Q.B. 540 (1954). Schtraks reverts to the rule of In re Castioni, 1891 Q.B. 149
(1890).
8E.g., the attempt to hijack a TWA aircraft and $75,000 from Chicago to North
Vietnam, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, at 1, col. 5, and the successful hijacking of an
Eastern Air Lines aircraft to Nassau and subsequent unsuccessful demand for $500,000
ransom. The hijacker was promptly deported to the United States as an "undesirable
alien." N.Y. Times, May 30, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
9Robert M. Helmey was acquitted by a jury in Savannah, Georgia, on a plea of
temporary insanity. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1969, at 66, col. 5. Robert Labadie, returned
by Cuba to the United States in September 1970, was found mentally incapable of
standing trial in December. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1970, at 6, col. 1.
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be explained by the relative inaccessibility of air travel in the countries
involved and the relative unavailability of friendly destinations."
Although hijacking is a serious enough act in itself,11 hijacking for
"public" motives introduces another dimension of danger-the poten-
tially explosive factor of international politics. An aircraft may be
forcibly diverted for the purpose of political retaliation. Hijacking may
serve opportunist objectives in foreign relations" as where insurrectionary
groups use this method to dramatize their causes." However, the flagrant
exhibitions of terrorism by the Palestine Liberation Front between July
and September 1970 seems to have led even those states which had
appeared to take a detached view of the offense to move more vigorously
toward adoption of measures of control, in particular the conclusion of
the 1970 Hague Convention.
Aircraft hijacking has had interesting "spin-offs" at the domestic and
foreign policy levels. Liability for losses sustained by passengers and
carriers is becoming an issue. Diversion of an aircraft is a costly matter
for the carrier.1 Destruction of an aircraft such as Pan American's
Boeing 747 in Cairo last September involves cost factors of both replace-
ment and recoupment of investment. Whether Pan American's losses
in this instance are to be met by all-risk insurance covered by two
United States insurance pools or by war-risk insurance covered jointly
by Lloyds of London and the United States Government is an issue
1 0 Cuba's willingness to serve as a hijack haven, until recently, undoubtedly en-
couraged the perpetration of this offense in the United States and other Western Hemi-
sphere countries.
11 If for no other reasons than because the aircraft, its passengers, and crew are en-
dangered.
1" Political retaliation was evident in June 1967, for example, when a KLM aircraft
carrying the Guinean Foreign Minister and the Guinean Permanent Representative to
the United Nations back to Guinea from a special session of the General Assembly was
diverted to the Ivory Coast. The passengers, one of whom was presumably vested with
diplomatic immunity, were held for almost three months, apparently in response to
Guinea's intereference with certain Ivory Coast nationals. 13 M. WIiITEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 129-31 (1968). See also Chicago Tribune, July 25, 1971, at 1,
col. 8 (diversion of a BOAC aircraft to Libya and removal of two Sudanese political
figures). Israel bombarded the Beirut airport in retaliation for an attack by members
of the Palestine Liberation Front on an El Al aircraft in Athens. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1968, at 1, col. 8.
13 E.g., Algerian detention of the crew of an El Al plane for six weeks in the sum-
mer of 1968, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1968, at 1, col. 7; Sept. 2, 1968, at 14, col. 6. Paki-
stani condonation of the destruction of an Indian Air Lines aircraft by members of a
Kashmiri political group, Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 17, 1971, at 3, col. 1.
14 Five aircraft were seized by members of the Palestine Liberation Front between
July and September 1970; the lives of some six hundred passengers arid crew were en-
dangered and four of the aircraft were destroyed.
15 For an analysis of the various provisions of the Convention see Mankiewicz, infra
at 195-210.
'
6 HouSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, AIRCRAFT PIRACY, H.R.
REP. No. 91-33, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969) [hereinafter cited as AIRcRAFT PIRACY].
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under litigation. ' A suit for damages has been brought under the terms
of the 1966 Montreal Agreement, supplementary to the Warsaw Con-
vention, by a passenger who alleged "bodily injury, wounding, mental
pain and anguish in expectation of severe injury and death" as a result
of her experience on the Swissair flight which was hijacked to Jordan
on September 6, 1970, by the Palestine Liberation Front.18 If the com-
plaint is successful, carriers with flights originating, stopping or termi-
nating in the United States could be subject to widespread legal action
by hijacked passengers, with a consequent impact upon the cost of air
travel. On the other hand, the success of the personal injury suit may
also lead to a revision of the current theory of limitation of carrier
liability in international air transport."
Another spin-off of aircraft hijacking has been the involvement of
private organizations in the effort to control the offense. Given the
ramifications of hijacking, an argument can be made for resort to any
method to alleviate the danger to passengers, crew and aircraft, even
submission to extortion. But a bad situation is compounded when private
agencies are constrained to exert pressure upon governments which
condone hijacking. The International Federation of Air Line Pilots
Associations has indicated more than once that while they have little
desire to police hijackers, they are not unprepared to enforce boycotts
of air transport services to hijack havens."0 In the face of the upsurge of
hijackings during 1968 and 1969, the Air Line Pilots Association and
the Air Transport Association of America offered a reward of $25,000
for information leading to the arrest and conviction of any violator of
the United States anti-hijacking law. 1 Pilots of British European Air-
ways were reported to have cancelled service to Israel following the rash
of hijackings to the Middle East in the late Summer of 1970." These
private reactions add up to exasperation with tardy governmental re-
sponse to control of the offense of aircraft hijacking. In that respect,
they have had a gadfly quality which has contributed to the movement
17 Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1971, at 12, col. 1. The issue of insurance liability
was resolved in favor of the carrier in American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Sunny South
Aircraft Service Inc., 140 So. 2d 78 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962), aff'd, 151 So. 2d 276 (Fla.
Sup. Ct. 1963).
11 New York Times, Sept. 22, 1970, § 1, at 14, col. 5.
19 Letter from Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld to the New York Times, Sept. 30, 1970,
at 40, col. 6.
2'N.Y. Times, July 18, 1968, § 4, at 5, col. 3; March 27, 1969, at 1, col. 3; letter
from Capt. C. C. Jackson, Executive Secretary IFALPA, to The Times (London),
Sept. 11, 1970, § 1, at 11, col. 3. IFALPA is reported to have put pressure on the French
government to prosecute two East Germans who hijacked a plane from Warsaw to the
French Zone of West Berlin in October 1969. They were tried by court martial and
sentenced to two years imprisonment. Figaro, Dec. 21, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
21 AIRCRAFT PIRACY 6.
22 N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1970, at 10, col. 5.
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toward the drafting and conclusion of international conventions designed
to control not only hijacking but also hijacking for purposes of extortion
and sabotage of both aircraft and related facilities.
One of the most serious effects of aircraft hijacking is its exacerbation
of strained relations between states. For example, the hijacking of an
Indian Air Lines plane from Srinigar to Lahore on January 30, 1971,
its subsequent destruction, and Pakistan's grant of political asylum to
the two perpetrators, members of the Kashmiri National Liberation
Front, brought prompt response from India in the form of a ban on
flights by Pakistani civil and military aircraft across Indian territory
until the hijackers had been surrendered and compensation paid for the
plane."3 Pakistan protested the Indian action to the United Nations
Security Council and to the International Civil Aviation Organization
and has recently reported that a Judicial Inquiry Commission has found
that the "hijacking was arranged by Indian Intelligence Services."" Yet
Pakistan's failure to prevent destruction of the aircraft or to institute
proceedings against the hijackers undermines the Pakistani case against
India's retaliatory act. Given the continuous pressures upon Indo-
Pakistani relations over the past two decades, coupled with the impact
of the current civil war in East Pakistan, the hijacking, whatever its
motivation, is one more inflammatory incident which, unlike the prob-
lem of the massive influx of refugees from East Pakistan into India,
could foreseeably have been controlled by Pakistan in the interests of
both international relations and the protection of international air
transport.
i-[. CONTROLLING THE OFFENSE
There can be little doubt that hijacking is a fully developed interna-
tional offense which can only be controlled by concerted action by states
acting both unilaterally and jointly. The evolution of methods of control
of the offense, however, has followed an empirical and demonstrably
erratic course of belated response to the event. The United States ap-
pears to have been the first state to take legislative action against the
crime of "air piracy,"' following three successful hijackings and one
unsuccessful hijacking in the Summer of 1961. A dozen states have
followed suit in recent years.2' But measures of prevention as well as
28The Economist, Feb. 13, 1971, at 1.
24 Pakistan News Digest, March 15, 1971, at 6, col. 3; at 11, col. 1; Pakistan Affairs,
April 22, 1971 (special issue).
25 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 902(i), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)(1) (Supp. 1971).
2"E.g., Crimes (Aircraft), No. 64 of 1963, 1 Acts of the Parliament of Australia
266 (1963); Cuban Hijacking Law, Sept. 16, 1969, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1175
(1969); Brazil, Decree-Law 975, Oct. 20, 1969, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 180 (1970);
Mexico, Decree of Dec. 19, 1968, amending Art. 170, Penal Code, 9 Irr'L LEGAL MA-
TERIALS 185 (1970).
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prosecution are necessary to control of the offense. In the United States,
the use of guards, including members of the Border Patrol, immigration
officers or special flight inspectors, was reported in 1961 and 1962,7
while after 1964, such precautions as locking cockpit doors during flight
were instituted.28 It was not until September 11, 1970, after the Palestine
Liberation Front's terrorist attacks upon international air transport"
that the United States undertook a "crash" program of training "sky
marshals" for duty on board aircraft and in airports. Their usefulness has
begun to show, for in the first six months of the current year they have
reportedly thwarted four out of five attempted hijackings."0 Although
there were six successful hijackings of American aircraft originating in
the United States during this same period, the sky marshal program,
together with the use of electronic searches and psychological observa-
tion of boarding passengers, is apparently contributing to a decline in
°the rate of successful hijackings of aircraft from the United States. 1
Another deterrent factor is the amount of publicity given to the sky
marshal and search programs and, to a much lesser extent, to the prose-
cution of hijackers in the United States. For several years after the 1961
eruption of hijacking, federal authorities seemed to operate on the belief
that the less said about the incidence of the offense the better, apparently
theorizing that persons disposed to the act would be attracted by any
publicity given to it. In the past two years, especially since the spring
of 1970, hijacking has been widely publicized and with some deterrent
effect.
Publicity is one method of control, prosecution is another. Informa-
tion continues to be sketchy about the number of prosecutions of suc-
cessful hijackers who have returned or been returned to the United
States as well as unsuccessful hijackers who have been arrested in this
country. ' There have been eleven prosecutions of successful hijackers.
21HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
AIR PIRACY IN THE CARMBEAN AREA, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (Comm. Print, 1968);
N.Y. Times, May 3, 1962, S 1, at 55, col. 5.
2 8ATry. GEN. ORDER No. 247-61, 26 Fed. Reg. 7614 (1961); 14 C.F.R. § 91.8
(1970).
2N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1970, at 11, col. 5; Sept. 22, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
30N.Y. Times, June 19, 1971, S 1, at 54, col. 8. The Air Transport Association has
reported that electronic detection devices have led to the arrest of 273 persons on charg-
es of hijacking, smuggling, and related offenses, within a sixteen month period. Id. This
detection device has been held constitutional in United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp.
1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
31 Christian Science Monitor, June 15, 1971, § B, at 8, col. 4. See also The Times
(London), May 31, 1971, § 1, at 5, col. 5.
-2 Among the few cases which have been reported are: United States v. Healy, 376
U.S. 75 (1964); United States v. Bearden, 304 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1962), vacated on
other grounds, 372 U.S. 252 (1963), obstruction of commerce charge aff'd, 320 F.2d 99
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 922 (1964); United States v. Clark, 19 WSCMA
82, 41 CMR 82 (1969).
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Nine received sentences ranging from two years for interference with air
navigation to life imprisonment for air piracy. One hijacker has been
acquitted on a plea of temporary insanity; another has been found in-
competent to stand trial. Although the penalty for aircraft piracy in the
United States ranges from twenty years imprisonment to death," the
severity of this penalty can be mitigated by "plea bargaining." In one
recent case, for example, charges of air piracy and kidnapping were
dropped, and the hijacker received ten years for interference with flight
crew members.' But plea bargaining can produce inequities, as in one
jurisdiction in which the hijacker of a plane with 151 persons aboard
received two years for interfering with the flight crew while another
person who hijacked a charter flight with only himself and the pilot
aboard received twenty years for air piracy.' United States courts gen-
erally are not kindly disposed toward potential or successful hijackers,
including those who put themselves in a position in which they can be
suspected of harboring designs against aircraft."
Prosecution of hijackers becomes more complex when the defense of
the political offense is invoked by the accused. In the classic case of
In re Kavic," the Swiss Federal Tribunal took the position in 1952 that
the political motivation of the Yugoslav hijackers, given the circum-
stances of the incident, outweighed any other considerations and recom-
mended denial of extradition. Whether the same decision would be as
readily reached today in Switzerland is questionable, for there is a dis-
cernible trend toward prosecution of hijackers by the state of first land-
ing for that offense or ancillary offenses while reserving the right to
grant political asylum to the offenders upon completion of their prison
sentences or to deport them, having regard for the requirements of
article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees."
Although rarely used, extradition of the offender to the state of regis-
tration of the aircraft or to the state of last departure on a charge of
hijacking is an alternative to prosecution in the state of first landing or
in a state having jurisdiction over the alleged offender. In 1961, for
example, Albert Cadon, a French national, hijacked a Pan American
3349 U.S.C. 1472(i)(1)(B) (1970).
31 Paterson Case, Fairbanks (Alaska) Daily Miner, June 12, 1971.
35 N.Y. Times, June 5, 1970, at 38, col. 2.
-"See United States v. Ware, 315 F. Supp. 1333 (W.D. Okla. 1970) (defendant
charged with attempting to board aircraft with unloaded pistol).
3' 19 INT'L L. REP. 371 (1952).
31 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150. This pattern has been evident recently in Argentina, Austria, Denmark, France,
and West Germany. Sweden's initiation of proceedings against the Greek hijacker,
Tsironis, and the Colombian hijacker, Dominguez Fuentes, following the grant of asy-
lum to each, is another phase of the movement toward prosecution by a state which had
no immediate connection with the offense.
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Airways aircraft from Mexico City to Havana. 9 At Mexico's request,
Cuban authorities extradited Cadon. He was prosecuted on charges of
robbery and illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to eight years
and nine months imprisonment."0 Recently, the Supreme Court of Turkey
is reported to have ruled that two Soviet nationals who hijacked an
Aeroflot plane to Turkey in October 1970, an incident in which a
stewardess was killed and two other members of the crew were injured,
were extraditable as the political motive was not a defense in the cir-
cumstances.' The court observed, however, that extradition is a matter
of executive discretion." It may be added that extradition is not the only
method of recovering fugitive offenders. Most hijackers who have been
returned to the state of departure have been expelled from the asylum
state or have voluntarily chosen to leave. '
Past efforts to control hijacking have been gradual and fitful, but
momentum has developed, as states have come to recognize that no
carrier is proof against attack and that the offense is not a peculiar
manifestation of Caribbean or Middle Eastern politics. Nevertheless,
successful containment of hijacking requires a three-pronged approach.
Unilateral action, ranging from provision for airport searches and guards
on aircraft to prosecution of offenders is one necessary element, but one
of partial value, given the international nature of the offense. Bilateral
action in the form of commitment of states to preventive measures re-
garding international flights as well as willingness to prosecute or extra-
dite hijackers is another necessary element. But even this element is only
effective if it is set in the frame of reference of multilateral action, taking
the form of a world-wide commitment of states to measures of prevention
and control.
The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo in 1963 and binding upon thirty-seven
states as of January, 1971, charted the course by identifying the offense
and establishing the responsibility of member states for facilitation and
protection of international air transport." The Convention for Suppres-
29N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1961, § 1, at 4, col. 1; Aug. 15, 1961, at 11, col. 1 (late
city ed.).
"See AIR PIRACY, supra note 27, at 26. See also In re Abarca, 40 INT'L L. REP.
208 (1970) (extradition from Belgium to Switzerland on a charge of aircraft sabotage).
1 N.Y. Times, March 9, 1971, § 1, at 15, col. 1.
42 Id.
41 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AMERICAN
AFFAIRS, Am PIRACY IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (Comm. Print,
1968) (Canada). Instances of expulsion also have been reported from Algeria, the Ba-
hamas, Cuba, Curacao, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad, the United States, and Yugo-
slavia. The hijackers in most of these instances were apparently tried for the hijacking
or ancillary offenses in the state to which they were returned. Id.
4Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. 6768. For the ten-
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sion of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,' signed at The Hague by fifty-nine
states on December 16, 1970, not only supplements the Tokyo Con-
vention by committing member states to the prosecution of hijackers,
but it also makes a highly significant contribution to the development of
international criminal law by establishing universal jurisdiction over the
offense so that the hijacker must be submitted to prosecution "without
exception whatsoever" in the member state in which he is found or, in
the alternative, he must be extradited. ' Loopholes in this provision can
be pointed out. States are committed only to submit the hijacker to
prosecution. Actual disposition of the case may be affected by a variety
of considerations, for example whether the accused is mentally com-
petent to stand trial, the possibility of plea bargaining or the assertion of
the political defense. The alternative of extradition is limited by the
political defense as well as the policy of some states to refuse surrender
of nationals although in the latter situation the state would be required
under the Convention to submit a hijacker of its nationality to its own
criminal process."
The plea of the political defense when offered by a hijacker is coming
under rigorous scrutiny in several states. Article 7 of The Hague Con-
vention reflects this trend by requiring that a member state must "submit
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.""9
This provision does not bar a grant of political asylum if the territorial
state finds that such action is warranted; it recognizes, however, that
states now and for sometime to come will, for humanitarian and political
reasons, reserve the right to weigh the political defense in any instance
of aircraft hijacking. 9 But the Convention implicitly limits a casual re-
sort to the political defense by putting the hijacker on notice that he
year history of the ICAO efforts leading to the Tokyo Conference, see Boyle & Pulsifer,
The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, 30 J. AIR L. & COMM. 305 (1964).
' Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for sig-
nature December 16, 1970, ICAO Doc. 8920, [hereinafter cited as Convention].
IId., art. 7.
47 Id.
49 Id. (emphasis added). Commenting on the political defense to aircraft hijacking,
the Legal Adviser to the Department of State (Stevenson) said: 'lIT]he convention
should serve notice on all hijackers that hijacking, whatever the motivation, is universal-
ly considered as a serious common crime and is not a mere political offense." 64
DEP'T STATE BULL. 50 (1971).
4 See generally Report of the Subcomm. on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, ICAO
Doc. LC/SC SA, §§ 14, 14.1, 15 (1969). In testimony before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Trans-
portation and Telecommunications said, with respect to the issue of political motiva-
tion: "We do not propose to change in any way our general policy on political asylum;
but we think the risks involved in the hijacking of commercial aircraft are great enough
so that neither we nor others should treat hijackers-whatever their motivation-as sim-
ple political offenders." 60 DEP'T STATE BULL. 212, 213 (1969).
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may be prosecuted for hijacking or ancillary crimes whatever disposition
may be made thereafter."
The process of developing controls over the international offense of
aircraft hijacking is not unlike the construction of a mosaic. Piece by
piece, the various processes are assembled and the whole should fit into
the larger construction of international criminal law. The next step is to
establish a way of dealing with the state which condones the offense,
particularly for purposes of international blackmail. A draft convention,
now under consideration by the ICAO Legal Committee, provides for
measures of concerted action against such a state, including suspension
of air services to it." A second step beyond The Hague Convention is
action on the draft convention for the suppression of acts of violence
directed against aircraft which are not in flight and against ground
installations."
What other directions should control of aircraft hijacking take, given
the factors of concern for protection of the interests of the genuine po-
litically motivated offender and the tendency of states to subsume the
offense to opportunistic foreign policy objectives? A state not wishing to
prosecute a hijacker or to extradite him might be willing to enforce the
criminal judgment rendered against him in another state. The European
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, con-
cluded by the Council of Europe on May 28, 1970," suggests this direc-
tion and has, moreover, far-reaching implications for the establishment
of a common system of criminal law within the European community.
Still another approach places the hijacker under international rather
than national jurisdiction. One such project calls for holding a hijacker
in "international custody" in Spandau Prison in West Berlin pending
trial, preferably before the International Court of Justice, assuming the
modification of its present jurisdiction." There has also been a revival
of interest in the project of an international criminal court which would
take jurisdiction over such international offenses as hijacking, terrorism
and kidnapping of foreign diplomatic personnel. The prototype for such
a court appears in the 1937 League of Nations Convention on the sub-
ject." Prosecution of international crimes having political overtones,
such as those mentioned above, before an international criminal court
50 Convention, art. 7 (emphasis added).
5165 DEP'T STATE BULL. 84, 88 (1971).
2 Id.
53 [1970] European T.S. No. 70.
5 See Smith, The Probable Necessity of an International Prison in Solving Aircraft
Hijacking, 5 INT'L LAWYER 269 (1971).
55 League of Nations Document, C. 548. M. 385. 1937. v. See also United Nations
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.48/4 (1951).
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or regional courts has considerable merit from the point of view of
administration of justice and concern for efforts looking toward in-
creased international cooperation. An international criminal court might
well be the catalyst for the emerging international system of criminal
law. But a realistic appraisal of international relations at present and
the prospects for the near future clearly indicates that the emphasis
should be placed upon securing world-wide acceptance of the Tokyo
Convention, The Hague Convention and the drafts now under consider-
ation by ICAO, thereby making the concerted effort to control the inter-
national offense of aircraft hijacking a prototype for cooperative action
looking to the multilateral control of other international offenses, thus
building a firm foundation for an international system of criminal law.

